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A PASSION FOR FASHION: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION SHOULD “STEP UP” ITS ROLE IN THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF DESIGN PATENTS 
 
The usefulness of the International Trade Commission as a forum for fashion 
design patents due to the confusion of United States Patent and Trademark 
Office-based and federal court-based intellectual property protections, looking at 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
“Cinderella is proof that a new pair of shoes can 
change your life.”1 Similarly, recent fashion law cases are 
                                                
	  
	  
1 Author unknown, “Cinderella is proof that a new pair of shoes can 
change your life,” http://www.scrapbook.com/quotes/doc/27219.html 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2015). 
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proof that a new forum can change a fashion designer’s 
intellectual property rights. One recent case, Christian 
Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent, brought to light a very 
important notion: there is a severe danger and disadvantage 
to the realm of fashion design when one designer holds a 
monopoly over a color, absent an acquired secondary 
meaning.2  Although the Federal District Court regarded 
Louboutin’s Chinese red shoe soles as “overly broad” and 
likely not protectable, the appeals courts gave Louboutin 
excessive intellectual property protection to its red-soled 
design.3 While it is important for designers to safeguard 
their new designs, thereby distinguishing their brand in 
order to draw consumer attention and create new business, 
intellectual property law, in general, must ensure that 
creativity is not being stifled by the monopolization of the 
creative works and styles of one designer.4 This dichotomy 
has engendered much fluidity with respect to decisions of 
fashion-related infringement cases.5  
A part of this fluidity arises from the confusing and 
interpretation-heavy, ambiguous standards necessary to 
satisfy infringement. This confusion exists for all forms of 
intellectual property, but most importantly for this case, for 
                                                
	  
	  
2 Julie Zerbo, Louboutin v. YSL Is Officially Over, THE FASHION LAW (Dec. 
28, 2012), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/archive/louboutin-v-ysl-is-
officially-over?rq=louboutin. 
3 Id. (citing Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent Am. Holdings, 
Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2012); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent 
Am., Inc. 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (2011)). 
4 See Darrell G. Mottley, The Tools for Protecting Fashion Law Clients, 2012 
WL 167353 *1, *1 (2012). 
5 Id.  
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trademarks and patents.6 This note will explore the 
unaccountable trademark standards relied upon in deciding 
the Louboutin case and proposes, instead, how the Louboutin 
case could have been better interpreted as a design patent 
case.7 From there, the note will analyze how Louboutin’s 
red-soled design might have prevailed as a design patent 
under federal patent standards versus the standards of the 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).8 Such an analysis 
will bring to light the fact that the ITC is the most 
advantageous and suitable forum for this particular fashion 
design litigation.9 The note will then analyze what protection 
would have been afforded to Louboutin in a European 
jurisdiction.10 
 
                                                
	  
	  
6 See Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2014); see also Marta Kowalczyk, Design Patent 
Infringement: Post-Egyptian Goddess, 2010 U. ILL. J. OF L. TECH. & POL’Y 
239 (2010). 
7 See generally Hughes, supra note 6; see generally Kowalczyk, supra note 6; 
see generally Mottley, supra note 4; see generally Debra D. Peterson, Seizing 
Infringing Imports of Cinderella’s Slippers: How Egyptian Goddess Supports 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Enforcement of Design Patents, 90 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 888 (2008); see generally Sarah Burstein, 
Moving Beyond the Standard Criticisms of Design Patents, 17 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 305 (2013). 
8 See generally Kowalczyk, supra note 6; see generally Robert E. Bugg, The 
International Trade Commission and Changes to United States Patent Law, 76 
BROOK L. REV. 1093 (2011); see generally Peterson, supra note 7. 
9 See generally Mottley, supra note 4. 
10 See generally Susanna Monseau, European Design Rights: A Model for the 
Protection of all Designers From Piracy, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 27 (2011); Tiffany 
Mahmood, Design Law in the United States as Compared to the European 
Community Design System: What Do We Need to Fix, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 555 (2014); see generally Sarah Burstein, supra note 
7. 
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II.   CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN S.A. V. YVES SAINT LAURENT 
AM. HOLDING, INC. 
 
Christian Louboutin is best known for his use of a 
contrasting, bright red coloration on the outsole of his 
heels.11 In fact, the “‘flash of a red sole’ is today ‘instantly’ 
recognizable, to ‘those in the know,” as Louboutin’s 
handiwork.”12  Contention recently arose when Yves Saint 
Laurent began to conceptualize and market a line of 
monochromatic pumps, including a red shoe, which 
featured a red insole, heel, upper, and outsole.13 Despite 
initial negotiations to try to avoid litigation, Louboutin 
ultimately filed an action under the Lanham Act on April 7, 
2011, claiming “(1) trademark infringement and 
counterfeiting, (2) false designation of origin and unfair 
competition, and (3) trademark dilution, as well as state 
claims for (4) trademark infringement, (5) trademark 
dilution, (6) and unfair competition, and unlawful deceptive 
acts and practices.”14 Louboutin also tried to obtain a 
preliminary injunction, which would prevent Yves Saint 
Laurent from marketing any shoes bearing a similar red 
outsole, or in any similar red shade, which might cause 
confusion among consumers.15 The District Court held that, 
with respect to the fashion industry, “single-color marks are 
inherently ‘functional’ and that any such registered 
                                                
	  
	  
11 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, Inc., 696 
F.3d 206, 213 (2012).  
12 Id. (quoting Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc., 
778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
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trademark would likely be held invalid.”16 “[T]rademark 
law is not intended to ‘protect[] innovation by giving the 
innovator a monopoly’ over a useful product feature”—
because fashion relies more on allure and appearance than 
other utility industries, the district court was wary of setting 
a precedent allowing single-color trademarks because this 
might ultimately hinder competition and creativity among 
designers.17  
 On appeal, Louboutin’s red soles were held to be 
protectable under the theory that the color was used in such 
a way that Louboutin had acquired a secondary meaning, 
thereby establishing the red soles as a distinctive symbol of 
the Louboutin brand.18 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, “the 
law provides the owner of a mark with the ‘enforceable right 
to exclude others from using [the mark].’”19 However, 
Louboutin’s protection was limited to just the contrasting 
red sole, and accordingly, Yves Saint Laurent was legally 
permitted to use the red sole on its monochromatic red 
pump.20 As such, the appellate court affirmed the District 
Court’s order permitting Yves Saint Laurent to use the red 
lacquered outsole on its monochrome red shoe, but reversed 
                                                
	  
	  
16 Id. at 214 (citing Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d. at 457); see also Qualitex Co. 
v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162, 115 S. Ct. 1300, 131 L.Ed.2d. 
248 (1995) (holding that color can be protected as a trademark only if it 
“acts as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their 
source, without serving any other significant function”). 
17 Id. (quoting Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 
n.4 (2nd Cir. 1995)); Kaitlin Powers, Saving Soles: The Limited Practical 
Application of Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America 
Holding, Inc., 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 335, 361 (2013). 
18 Id. at 225. 
19 Id. at 216 (quoting La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean 
Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974)).  
20 Id. at 228. 
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the District Court’s order denying trademark protection to 
Louboutin’s contrasting red lacquered outsole.21 
 
III.   POSSIBLE PROTECTIONS FOR FASHION DESIGNS UNDER 
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
 
As U.S. intellectual property laws have evolved, 
uncertainty has arisen as to what basis must be relied upon 
in order to protect intellectual property rights most 
effectively and thoroughly.22 Two of the main sectors relied 
upon by fashion designers are trademark law and patent 
law.  
 
A.   TRADEMARKS 
 
Christian Louboutin relied upon trademark law for 
protection in an effort to estop Yves Saint Laurent’s 
marketing of what Louboutin deemed to be a confusingly 
similar exploitation of his signature red-soled heels.23 While 
Louboutin was granted a trademark for his red soles, that 
trademark did not inhibit Yves Saint Laurent’s use of the red 
soles on its monochromatic shoes—the product at issue.24 
The ambiguity of trademark law standards likely 
contributed to this somewhat inadequate win on 
Louboutin’s part.  
 
 
                                                
	  
	  
21 Id. at 229.  
22 Peterson, supra note 7, at 892 (citing R. CARL MOY, 1 MOY’S WALKER ON 
PATENTS §5:41 (4th ed. 2007)).  
23 See generally Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 206. 
24 See generally id.  
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1.   CONFUSING STANDARDS IN TRADEMARK LAW 
   
Currently, trademark law incorporates—and thereby 
permits registration for—marks that are used in commerce, 
which are inherently distinctive or have acquired 
distinctiveness through the acquisition of secondary 
meaning, so long as the mark is nonfunctional.25 Trademark 
law application and precedent entertains a tendentious 
reading of functionality. 
 
a)   FUNCTIONALITY 
 
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, used 
by a person to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . 
and to indicate the source of the goods . . . .”26 This definition 
grants quite broad protection, especially in the realm of 
fashion, because one designer can claim exclusive trademark 
ownership over even the slightest detail, thus creating a 
monopoly on a simple design that becomes an of-the-
moment trend; this is a major underlying reason for the 
excessive prices certain brands are capable of charging their 
customers.27 One limit that the Lanham Act imposes on this 
seemingly overbroad definition is the functionality doctrine, 
                                                
	  
	  
25 Rohini Roy, Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent: The Second Circuit’s 
Functionality Faux Pas, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 519, 540 (2014) (citing 
Abercrombie and Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d 
Cir. 1976); Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)). 
26 Id. at 520 (quoting Lanham Act §45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
27 Id. at 521. Louboutin’s red-colored soles are “capable of carrying 
meaning” and the Lanham Act is broad enough to “include color within 
the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark.” Id. (quoting 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995)). 
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whereby product features that are “essential to the use or 
purpose of the article” or “[affect] the cost or quality of the 
article” are denied trademark protection.28 There are two 
categories of functionality: utilitarian and aesthetic.29 
Because the utilitarian functionality doctrine is aimed more 
towards technical or mechanical functionality, aesthetic 
functionality is a more relevant sector to analyze with 
respect to fashion design.30  Aesthetic functionality 
incorporates the basic tenets of utilitarian law, but the main 
focus is more fact-specific and looks to the design’s impact 
on competition.31 
 
i.   AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY APPLICATION 
 
When reviewing Louboutin’s trademark infringement 
allegations against Yves Saint Laurent, the New York 
Southern District Court (“District Court”) held that the red 
color used by Louboutin on the soles of its shoes was 
aesthetically functional and that no single designer had the 
right to keep other designers from using such a critical and 
desired hue on their footwear.32 Controversially, the Second 
Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling, instead 
                                                
	  
	  
28 Id. (citing Lanham Act §§2(e)(5), 43 (a)(1)(3), 14(3) (2006); quoting 
Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)). 
29 Roy, supra note 25, at 526 (citing Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction 
of TrafFix: Trade Dress Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA 593, 597 
(2010)). 
30 See Hughes, supra note 6, at 1247 (citing Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. 
McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in 
Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO L.L. 2055, 2063 (2012)).    
31 Ashley E. Green, Red Touches Black: The First Application of Maker’s Mark 
and Louboutin in the Context of Color Trademarks, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y. & L. 981, 987 (2014).  
32 Roy, supra note 25, at 533 (citing Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454). 
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maintaining that Louboutin did in fact have a valid 
trademark in the red sole of its heels because of the “pop” 
engendered by the contrasting nature of the shoe’s colored 
exterior and its ruby-red sole.33 However, the Second Circuit 
failed to address the aesthetic functionality of Louboutin’s 
red-soled shoes, generally concluding that not all single 
color marks are aesthetically functional when within the 
realm of the fashion industry.34 It relied on Louboutin’s 
acquisition of secondary meaning for its red-soled heels (a 
design aspect that, through advertising, media coverage, and 
sale volume, created one of the “most revered shoes around 
the globe”35) to solidify Louboutin’s enforceable trademark 
and created a balancing test between “‘the competitive 
benefits of protecting source-identifying aspects’ of a mark 
[and] the ‘competitive costs of precluding competitors from 
using the feature’” to overcome the need for a functionality 
analysis of the red soles.36 The Second Circuit found that 
                                                
	  
	  
33 Id. at 534 (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 229; Scott Flaherty, How They 
Won It: McCarter Saves Louboutin’s Soles, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/how-they-won-it-mccarter-saves-
loubouti-98617/; Benjamin Weiser, Shoe Designer Can Protect Its ‘Pop’ of 
Red, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/nyregion/court-rules-
louboutin-can-enforce-a-trademark-on-its-red-outsoles.html?_r=0). 
34 Id. (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 223). 
35 Id. at 532 (quoting Danielle E. Gorman, Protecting Single color 
Trademarks in Fashion After Louboutin, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 
370 (2012)).  
36 Id. at 535 (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 222-228); see also Ashley E. 
Green, Red Touches Black: The First Application of Maker’s Mark and 
Loubutin in the Context of Color Trademarks, 22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 981, 990 (2014) (citing Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 226 (describing the six 
part test relied upon in Louboutin in determining whether a design 
feature has secondary meaning: “(1) advertising expenses; (2) consumer 
studies linking the purported mark to the source; (3) media coverage of 
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giving Louboutin a trademark for its popping red soles 
would not “significantly [undermine] competitors’ ability to 
compete in the relevant market,” which was evident by the 
fact that Yves Saint Laurent could still utilize red soles on its 
monochromatic, non-popping heel design.37  
 “Sometimes color plays an important role . . . in making 
a product more desirable.”38 This is the more traditional 
functionality approach, which was relied upon by the 
District Court in its conclusion that Louboutin’s red shoe 
soles were aesthetically functional and, accordingly, were 
not capable of trademark registration or protection.39 The 
red lacquered soles of the Louboutin heels certainly appeal 
to the aesthetic values of consumers, but “[a] design is 
functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a 
significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the 
use of alternative designs.”40 In the fashion industry 
especially, it is important to navigate a balanced path 
through the murky waters of innovative design protection 
and healthy design competition—the murkiness of that 
balance, and the disparate applications of the relevant 
aspects of such a balance, is what has caused so much 
controversy over whether a design feature is merely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
the product; (4) sales success; (5) attempts at plagiarism; and (6) length of 
time the mark has been used”)). 
37 Hughes, supra note 6, at 1240 (citing Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves 
Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 222 (2012)). 
38 Id. at 1242 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 
(1995) (holding that “the right touch of beauty” given “to common and 
necessary things” might “interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-
related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an 
important product [feature]”)). 
39 See generally Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d. 
40 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §17, cmt. c 
(1995) (emphasis added)).  
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aesthetically functional (and therefore not protectable) or 
distinct, yet not sufficiently inhibiting of future potential 
designs to qualify as aesthetically functional.41 This 
imbalance seems to insinuate that trademark is perhaps not 
the most suitable legal framework to rely upon in fashion 
design infringement cases.  
 
B.   DESIGN PATENTS 
 
Patent law is a blossoming arena of intellectual 
property protection that is acquiring more attention from 
fashion designers.42 Design patents “serve to promote 
decorative arts: ‘those arts which are made to serve a 
practical purpose but are nevertheless prized for the quality 
of their workmanship and the beauty of their appearance’”43 
Designers who create any nonfunctional, “new, original, and 
ornamental” design for an article of manufacture are eligible 
to receive a design patent from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).44 Such an article of manufacture 
is broadly construed to encompass “anything made by the 
hands of a man from raw materials, whether literally by 
hand or by machinery or art.”45 Given these 
                                                
	  
	  
41 See generally Green, supra note 31, at 1005.  
42 See Mottley, supra note 4, at 5. 
43 Christina Phillips, The Real Cinderella Story: Protecting the Inherent 
Artistry of the Glass Slipper Using Industrial Design, 48 VAL. U.L. REV. 1177, 
1198 (2014).  
44 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)).  
45 Id. at 1199 (citing Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate 
Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark 
Protection for Product Designs, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 336 (2008) 
(quoting Application of Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1967) 
(quoting Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699, 703 (3d Cir. 1913))). 
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characterizations, it seems as though Louboutin’s red-soled 
shoes would meet the requirements for design patent 
acquisition. Presently, Louboutin would be unable to acquire 
a design patent given the statutory bar imposed by 35 U.S.C. 
§102, which bars application for design patents after a year 
from the public offering of the product. The following, 
therefore, is essentially a thought experiment: Could 
Louboutin have met the requisite standards for a design 
patent, and would this form of intellectual property have 
afforded a more effective and comprehensive protection?46  
 
1.   CONFUSING STANDARDS IN PATENT LAW 
 
In order to acquire patent protection, designs must 
satisfy the general requirements of novelty and 
nonobviousness, although there have been modifications to 
both of these standards over time and there will likely be 
future revisions to better identify and protect ornamental 
features that the design patent enactment originally set out 
to preserve.47 Functionality is an affirmative defense to 




                                                
	  
	  
46 Doug Johnson, At The Intersection of Copyrights and Design Patents, 
MILLER & MARTIN PLLC, 
https://www.millermartin.com/sites/default/files/documents/Copyri
ght%20&%20Design%20Patent%201%20pager%20v2.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2016).   
47 Burstein, supra note 7, at 309 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2011)). 
48 Margot E. Parmenter, Louboutins and Legal Loopholes: Aesthetic 
Functionality and Fashion, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1079 n.249 (2013) (citing 
Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 216-17). 
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a)   NOVELTY 
 
The point of novelty test was first set forth in Litton 
Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.49 The fundamental crux of this 
test was whether the accused design appropriated the 
novelty in the patented design.50 The point of novelty test, 
however, was abolished recently in the case Egyptian Goddess 
Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. in favor of the more pliable ordinary 
observer standard addressed below.51 There, the point of 
novelty test was deemed inadequate because: (1) it focused 
on individual aspects of designs rather than the designs in 
their entirety; (2) it was difficult to apply to more novel 
designs; and (3) there was always ambiguity as to the extent 
to which prior art elements constituted a point of novelty.52 
As such, the ordinary observer test alone seemed to be a 
better fit because it incorporated the important aspects of the 





                                                
	  
	  
49 See generally 728 F.2d 1423, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 14850, 221 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
50 David A. Kalow and Milton Springut, Distinct Point-of-Novelty Test for 
Design Patents Ends, 240 (No.86) N.Y. L. J. (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://springutlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/NYLJ_-
Distinct-of-Novelty-Test-For-Design-Patents-Ends.pdf.  
51 Eva Szarenski, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.: A Dramatic Change in 
the Law of Design Patents?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 89, 90 (2009) (citing Egyptian 
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 655, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding 
that the point of novelty test no longer stood alone as a second and 
freestanding requirement for proof of design patent infringement)).  
52 Id. at 106-07 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d 655, 678 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
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i.   ORDINARY OBSERVER TEST 
 
The “ordinary observer” test, now deemed sufficient 
to guard against sweeping assertions of patent rights to an 
extent that hurts innovation and competition, was set forth 
in Gorham Co. v. White, where the court looked to whether 
the patented design and the product at issue were so similar 
that an ordinary observer would be motivated to purchase 
the accused product under the assumption that it was the 
patented design.53 Using the ordinary observer standard 
ensures that the measurement of the relative value and 
importance of the design feature is analyzed in the way that 
the designers intended: through the eyes of an ordinary 
consumer in a store.54 One alteration to the original ordinary 
observer standard is that now, the test asks that the court 
take into account the prior art, should the patented and 
accused designs not appear plainly dissimilar on direct 
comparison.55 
With respect to the Louboutin case, the standard 
would be whether observers of ordinary acuteness, “who are 
the principal purchasers of the articles to which designs have 
given novel appearances” (the buyers of red-soled 
Louboutin heels), would be confused, misled, or induced to 
purchase the other article (Yves Saint Laurent’s red-soled 
monochromatic shoe) because the consumers mistakenly 
assumed it was either the same article or was created by the 
                                                
	  
	  
53 Mottley, supra note 4, at 7 (citing Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 
(1872)). 
54 See Janice M. Mueller and Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the 
“Impossible Issue” of Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L. J. 419, 472 
(2010-2011). 
55 See Szarenski, supra note 49, at 108 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 
F.3d at 678). 
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same designer.56 It would then be left up to the discretion of 
the court to establish whether the red soles of both 
Louboutin’s and Yves Saint Laurent’s heels would be so 
substantially similar as to deceive an ordinary consumer, 
giving the attention that a typical consumer would give in 
the shoe-purchasing process.57  
 
b)   NONOBVIOUSNESS 
 
Nonobviousness is often regarded as a requirement 
that, although somewhat reasonable when analyzing utility 
patents, is unsuitable, subjective, impractical, and, some 
argue, even impossible with respect to designs.58 Only time 
will tell what alterations will be made to these design patent 
standards to ultimately extend a more evolved and thorough 
protection to designs.  
In addition to being new, a patentable fashion design 
“must meet the difficult requirement of nonobvious,” which 
means that the “design must not be obvious to another 
fashion designer [(one of ordinary skill who designs articles 
of the type involved)] in light of all similar articles 
previously created.”59 This standard is seemingly 
                                                
	  
	  
56 See Gorham Co., 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1872).  
57 Id. 
58 Mueller and Brean, supra note 42, at 420.  
59 Phillips, supra note 42, at 1199 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“A 
patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains.”); Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design 
Patent: Illusion or Reality? Twenty Years of Design Patent Litigation Since 
Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 195, 223 (1985) (“To resolve the question of 
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unconquerable, especially given the communicative and 
borrowing nature of the fashion industry: In order to 
compete with domestic and foreign markets, fashion 
designers are constantly adopting and adapting new trends 
in order to stay afloat.60 Nonobviousness seems contrary to 
the customary routines and strategies of the well-established 
field of fashion design. 
Further, when reviewing a design, one must consider 
the design as a whole, rather than looking at the design 
element-by-element.61 Essentially, the question at issue in 
this regard is whether the qualitative aspects sought to be 
combined are “so related that the appearance of certain 
ornamental features in one would suggest the application of 
those features in another.”62 The design must also be 
“different enough from prior art to warrant a patent” (a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
obviousness, the court must first view the prior art as disclosed by 
previous patents and then, using expert testimony if needed, decide 
whether the new design claimed represents more than the product of a 
person ordinarily skilled in the trade, having knowledge of the prior 
art.” (quoting Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996)). 
60 See Phillips, supra note 42, at 1218. 
61 Dennis Crouch, Fleshing-Out Design Patent Infringement Doctrine, 
PATENTLYO, http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/crocs-inc-v-us-
international-trade-commission-itc-fed-cir-2010-in-the-matter-of-certain-
foam-footware-in-2006-t.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2015); but see Mottley, 
supra note 4, at 5 (noting that, in design patent cases, ornamental features 
or combinations of features can be separated out from the rest of a 
fashion garment in drawings so that only the important design aspects 
aspiring for protection are highlighted). 
62 Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the 
Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 605 (quoting Application of 
Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1956)).  
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standard that is somewhat assessed within the novelty test 
mentioned above).63  
Louboutin uses the sole of heels, a known element, in 
a novel manner by giving the sole a contrasting color pop 
using a bright, candy-apple red coloration which stands in 
stark contrast to the darkened or loud-patterned hue of the 
outer shoe.64 Whether Louboutin’s design patent might 
inhibit Yves Saint Laurent’s use of the red coloration on its 
heel soles meets a similar burden as was faced by the 
trademark analysis undergone in the case. Louboutin might 
be able to assert that the red sole in general, and not just the 
contrast of the sole to the outer coloration of the shoe, is a 
part of its patent and that Yves Saint Laurent’s adoption of 
the red sole in their monochromatic shoe is a simulation of 
Louboutin’s signature embellishment, putting Yves Saint 
Laurent in violation of Louboutin’s design patent.65 
Conversely, Yves Saint Laurent could argue that the use of a 
single color for the entirety of its heels serves a different and 
distinct ornamental purpose, which stands apart from the 
contrasting pop of the Louboutin heels. Granting a shoe 
color monopoly to Louboutin because of a single ornamental 
design innovation would be a disgrace to fashion designers 
everywhere.66  
                                                
	  
	  
63 Id. at 598 (citing In re Bartlett, 300 F.2d 942, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). 
64 See Phillips, supra note 42, at 1199 (citing Lindgren, supra note 57, at 
224). 
65 See Mottley, supra note 4, at 5 (“Design patents are essential tools in 
protecting against clone and simulation-type products made by third 
parties.”). 
66 See Phillips, supra note 42, at 1227 (asserting that the inherent artistry 
and creativity of high fashion deserves protection, and that the current 
state of intellectual property protections are not adequate to provide that 
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c)   FUNCTIONALITY 
 
Design patent law, like trademark law, prohibits 
protection for functional elements; however, ornamental 
aspects not solely dictated by functionality are protected.67 
Utilitarian aspects of design are not incorporated into the 
design patent definition.68 In this regard, it is likely that the 
trademark standard of utilitarian functionality, rather than 
the trademark standard of aesthetic functionality, is the type 
excluded from protection here. Functionality is not at issue 
in the Louboutin case because the red-colored soles are 
ornamental aspects of the shoe’s design. Although the sole of 
the shoe is at issue, which is a functional aspect of the heel 
design, the color—a decorative aspect—is the alleged 
infringing content and, accordingly, functionality is not 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
sort of safeguarding, especially in the reproductive, competitive market 
in which these fashion design creations lie). 
67 Maggie Diamond, A Defense of Industrial Design Rights in the United 
States, 5 N.Y.U.  J. OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 1, 13 (2015) (citing Rosco 
Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, The Protection of Designs Under U.S. Law, 4/2008 IPRINFO 1, 
10 (2008); Orit Fischman Afori, The Role of the Non-functionality 
Requirement in Design Law, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MED. & ENT. L.J. 
847, 853-54 (2010)). 
68 Id.  
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IV.   INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
 
A.   THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 
 
The ITC was created in 1974 to govern international 
trade laws, thereby promoting the United States as a 
contender in the competitive global commercial 
marketplace.69 Because the ITC is granted jurisdiction to 
address import patent infringement and patent validity 
disputes, it is essentially an alternative venue to federal 
court for litigating patent disputes.70 
The ITC is an appealing alternative to federal court 
for complainants because it offers a faster resolution for 
patent infringement claims.71 However, ITC litigation is 
often accompanied by simultaneous litigation in federal 
court because ITC proceedings only afford complainants 
exclusion orders, while federal courts can provide 
                                                
	  
	  
69 Bugg, supra note 8, at 1094 (citing About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2015)). 
70 Id. (citing Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional 
Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 544 (2009); Douglas P. Martin, 
Preclusive Effect of Factual Determinations of the International Trade 
Commission with Regard to Patent Matters, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 885-86 (1995)). 
71 Joshua D. Furman, Reports of Section 337’s Death Have Been Greatly 
Exaggerated: The ITC’s Importance in an Evolving Patent Enforcement 
Environment, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 489, 491 (2015) (“Section 337 
investigations are typically completed within eighteen months, while 
federal court proceedings may take as long as several years.” (citing 
PETER S. MENELL ET AL., SECTION 337 PATENT INVESTIGATION 
MANAGEMENT GUIDE §1.4 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. eds., 2012)). 
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complainants with monetary damages and injunctions.72 If a 
complainant is more invested in stopping the importation of 
allegedly infringing goods, rather than acquiring some form 
of monetary compensation—which seemed to be the crux of 
Louboutin’s desire in its confrontation with Yves Saint 
Laurent—the ITC would likely be a better forum for 
handling a design patent dispute.  The ITC has the power to 
order the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to exclude 
imported products that infringe upon valid U.S. design 
patents at the border, and it does so at a faster rate than that 
typically accorded by the District Court.73 
The ITC is “well equipped to handle patent and 
trademark disputes and has the governmental power to 
enforce the exclusions of infringing products into the US 
from any source” within the global sphere, pursuant to a 
Section 337 investigation.74 The ITC has in rem jurisdiction 
over articles imported into the United States, and it can 
                                                
	  
	  
72 Id. (citing Menell, supra note 1, at 1-24); see also Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, 
Recasting the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in the Patent 
System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2345 (2013) (citing Section 337 
Investigations: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, PUB. NO. 4105 1, 3 (2009), 
http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf; 
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (“Injunctive relief typically takes the form of an 
exclusion order that bars importation of the infringing products and that 
is enforced by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.”)). 
73 Mottley, supra note 4, at 7. 
74 Id.; see also Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical 
Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 63, 71 (2008) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)-(B); Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, §1342(a)(1) 
(“Section 337 provides relief from unfair methods of competition and 
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States, or in their 
sale, if the effect or tendency of such actions is to destroy or substantially 
injure a U.S. industry.”)). 
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bring charges against an alleged infringer even when it lacks 
personal jurisdiction.75 “A Section 337 investigation begins 
with a complainant alleging that one or more parties’ 
‘imports . . . injure[s] a domestic industry or violate[s] U.S. 
intellectual property rights.’”76 The domestic industry 
requirement of Section 337 is satisfied by a two-prong 
analysis: 1) the economic prong, which can be satisfied by 
showing that the complainant has made a substantial 
investment in domestic activities; and 2) the technical prong, 
which can be satisfied by showing that the complainant has 
a domestic product (usually established via evidence of 
manufactured goods).77 A weak showing of one prong can 





                                                
	  
	  
75 Bugg, supra note 8, at 1094. 
76 Furman, supra note 69, at 489, 493 (citing Mission Statement, USITC, 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/mission_statement.htm; the 
comparison chart in Menell, supra note 1, at §1.2.3 (making clear that, 
unlike federal court proceedings, Section 337 investigations require a 
showing of both patent infringement and a trade violation)); see also 
Intellectual Property Infringement and Other Unfair Acts, USITC, 
https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 
2015). 
77 Id. at 494 (citing Wei Wang, Non-practicing Complainants at the ITC: 
Domestic Industry or Not?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 409, 414-16 (2012); 
FAQs, INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.itctla.org/resources/faqs (last visited Dec. 21, 2015)).  
78 Anders Fernstom, Exploiting the ITC’s Domestic Industry Requirement 
Through Licensing, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 107, 116 (2013). 
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B.   THE LOUBOUTIN CASE MEETS THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 
REQUIREMENT, ASSUMING LOUBOUTIN TAKES THE 
NECESSARY STEPS TO ACQUIRE A DESIGN PATENT 
 
Past decisions indicate that trade dress—which we 
can assume extends to trademark as well—and design 
patent protection can co-exist when the “shape of the 
product is ornamental and also serves to distinguish the 
source of the goods and services.”79 These are distinct 
protections that offer the owner of the intellectual property 
different spectrums of security for varied amounts of time.80 
In Louboutin’s case, acquiring a design patent for its red-
soled heels would protect the non-functional, ornamental, 
red-hued soles for fourteen years from intentional 
substantial copying, while the trademark it establishes will 
serve to protect the Louboutin brand from other brands’ 
products that might create a likelihood of confusion in the 
eyes of consumers for as long as Louboutin uses the mark in 
                                                
	  
	  
79 Julia Anne Matheson, Combine and Conquer: How the Synthesis of Design 
Patent and Trade Dress Achieve Maximum Protection for your Product Design, 
FINNEGAN (2009), 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news
=74f843be-c63a-40cc-8ae0-007bc50fdd99 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (citing 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 7:91 (4th ed. 2008)); see also Robert S. Katz and Helen Hill 
Minsker, Trademarks by Design: Combining Design Patents and Trademarks 
to Protect Your Intellectual Property, NAT. L. J. (May 1, 2000), 
http://bannerwitcoff.com/_docs/library/articles/bydesign.pdf 
(referencing examples of well-known design trademarks that also have 
design patents: DUSTBUSTER® vacuum cleaner, PEPSI®bottle, and the 
HONEYWELL® round thermostat). 
80 Id. (referencing In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 140 USPQ 575, 579 
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (patent and trademark rights “exist independently of, 
under different law and for different reasons”)). 
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commerce.81 The following explains how Louboutin meets 
the domestic industry requirement, should it desire to 
extend the protection over its popping red-soled heels. 
 
1.   LOUBOUTIN MEETS ECONOMIC PRONG 
 
In order to satisfy the economic prong of the Section 
337’s domestic industry requirement, Louboutin would need 
to prove: “(A) significant investment in plant and equipment 
relating to the domestic articles, (B) significant employment 
of labor or capital relating to the domestic articles; or (C) 
substantial investment in exploitation of the patent, 
including engineering, research and development or 
licensing.”82  To satisfy this prong, Louboutin would likely 
rely on Option C, because it provides the greatest flexibility 
to complainants: foreign entities that have principal 
locations outside of the United States are not automatically 
disqualified from meeting the economic prong based upon 
their investments in the United States market.83  From a 
fashion design perspective, research development and new 
style-experimentation is done via fashion shows and 
catwalks.84 These presentations highlight the in-vogue styles 
                                                
	  
	  
81 See and compare id. 
82 Charles Sanders, Domestic Industry Continued to Evolve at ITC in 2014, 
Law360 (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Attorn
ey%20Articles/2015/Domestic%20Industry%20Continued%20To%20Ev
olve%20At%20ITC%20In%202014.pdf (citing 19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(3)).  
83 See id. 
84 See Susannah Frankel, The Big Question: What is the point of fashion 
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of the coming season, inherently advertising and collecting 
reactionary responses to the new trends worn by the 
models.85 Christian Louboutin participates in several fashion 
shows, putting its lacquered, red-soled heels on the models 
at events like Paris Fashion Week, London Fashion Week, 
and, most importantly, New York Fashion Week.86 
Louboutin practices quality control by ensuring, even on its 
globally-reaching website, that consumers are aware of so 
called “Cheap Louboutin” or “Louboutin Outlet” shoes; 
Louboutin demands, for the protection of its brand and its 
consumers, that consumers buy via authorized retailers, 
directed to through its website.87 Louboutin also houses a 
search engine check on its website where consumers can 
confirm that the search engine they plan on using to 
purchase a pair of Louboutin’s signature heels is not actually 
selling infringing products.88  
Furthermore, Louboutin’s shoes might be 
manufactured in Paris, but they are likely composed of 
products imported from China, and are likely packaged and 
somewhat retrofitted by the retail stores who carry 
Louboutin’s red-soled heels in the United States, among 
other countries who advertise and offer Louboutin’s shoe-




86 Christian Louboutin Adds Some Sole to New York Fashion Week, 
LOUBOUTIN (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/news/en_christian-louboutin-
adds-some-sole-to-nyfw-ss-2016.  
87 Stopfake, LOUBOUTIN, 
http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/stopfake (last visited Jan. 2, 
2015). 
88 Id.  
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wear for sale.89 Taken together, these factors point toward 
Louboutin’s satisfaction of the requisite factors under the 
economic prong of the domestic industry requirement.90 
 
2.   LOUBOUTIN MEETS TECHNICAL PRONG 
 
Section 337’s technical prong analysis is the same as 
that for patent infringements: “a complainant must show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that an article practices one 
or more claims of the patent at issue either literally or under 
the doctrine of equivalents.”91 Simply put, Louboutin would 
need to discern “domestic articles” that practice or exploit its 
red-soled shoe design patent.92 Louboutin has nineteen 
stores in the United States, which advertise, stock, and sell 
the exclusive popping red-soled pumps: two in West 
Hollywood, one in Santa Monica, one in San Francisco, five 
in New York, two in Miami, three in Las Vegas, one in 
Dallas, one in Costa Mesa, two in Chicago, and one in 
                                                
	  
	  
89 See generally Thomas Stiebel, ITC Proceedings Offer Growing Market 
Protections, in TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE 
UPCOMING YEAR (2015). 
90 See id. (“For example, research and development activities 
characterized as pre-manufacturing, field engineering, testing, quality 
control, repair, retro-fitting, and/or packaging have been sufficient to 
constitute domestic industry in prior investigations.”). 
91 S. Alex Lasher, The Evolution of the Domestic Industry Requirement in 
Section 337 Investigations Before the United States International Trade 
Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 171 (2010) (citing Certain 
Display Controllers and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-481, 
at 5253 (Feb. 2005) (citing Certain Doxorubicin and Preparations 
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-300, Initial Determination at 109 (May 
1990)).  
92 See Sanders, supra note 80. 
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Atlanta.93 These nineteen stores necessitate domestic 
investment and employment on Louboutin’s part and, 
accordingly, Louboutin likely also meets the technical prong 
requirements.94 
 
V.   SECTION 337 PROCEEDINGS 
  
Because Louboutin appears to meet the domestic 
industry requirement, the ITC would have proper 
jurisdiction to carry forward a Section 337 proceeding, 
whereby Louboutin could attempt to effectively exclude 
Yves Saint Laurent’s allegedly infringing red-soled 
monochromatic shoes from importation into the United 
States.95 Section 337 “provides relief from unfair methods 
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United 
States, or in their sale, if the effect or tendency of such 
actions is to destroy or substantially injure a U.S. industry.”96 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
relaxed the requirement of proof of injury, mandating only 
sufficient proof of injury via a finding of intellectual 
property infringement.97 The overall decisional process 
incorporates a determination on such proof of injury, along 
                                                
	  
	  
93 Store Locator, LOUBOUTIN, 
http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/storelocator/north-
america/united-states (last visited Jan. 1, 2015). 
94 Crouch, supra note 59 (fleshing out how a complainant can prove that 
it practices its own patent in the domestic industry).  
95 See Bugg, supra note 8, at 1098-99. 
96 Chien, supra note 72 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2007); 19 U.S.C. § 
1337(a)(1)(B) et seq.).  
97 Id. at 75-76. 
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with a determination of the public policy implications of the 
decision.98  
 On appeal, Louboutin’s popping, candy-red-soled 
heels were deemed to be a part of its trademark (and, based 
on the above analysis, Louboutin’s red soles would also 
meet the requirements of a design patent).99 While the 
District Court and the appellate court found no trademark 
infringement on the part of Yves Saint Laurent, this does not 
conclusively mean that the ITC would reach the same result. 
This is especially true because of the public policy 
implications that the administrative law judge, and, 
subsequently the ITC, can integrate into its decision-
making—the ITC’s administrative statute directs the forum 
to consider the public interest when issuing a remedy.100 
Fashion design is an area of innovation and creation that 
might be examined differently by the ITC. Although 
granting one fashion designer a monopoly over the color of a 
shoe sole seems, at face value, like a major inhibition to other 
creators in the fashion industry, allowing such a mark to be 
unfairly usurped by another designer—essentially 
advantaging another designer via the confusion of 
consumers as to the true brand of the red-soled shoes 
                                                
	  
	  
98 See Robert G. Krupka, Philip C. Swain, and Russell E. Levine, Section 
337 And the GATT: The Problem or the Solution?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 799 
(1993). 
99 See generally Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, Inc., 
696 F.3d 206 (2012). 
100 See Krupka, Swain, & Levine, supra note 96, at 799; see also 19 U.S.C. § 
1337(d)(1) (2006) (setting forth the policy consideration to be made by the 
Commission of the effect on “competitive conditions in the US economy, 
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the US, and US 
consumers” when deciding whether articles should be excluded from 
entry”); see also Colleen v. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The 
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 19 (2012). 
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advertised—violates the tenets by which intellectual 
property law abides. Depending upon which policy 
rationale sways the ITC, Louboutin might actually succeed 
on its unfair trade infringement claim, and Yves Saint 
Laurent’s monochromatic red heels would no longer be 
allowed importation into the United States.  
While I personally value creative expression and 
think that trends in fashion often necessitate duplication or, 
at the very least, inspiration in order for designers to 
effectively compete in the market place, it seems unfair to 
short-change individual creative innovations by permitting 
their exploitation by other designers just for the sake of 
economic competition and livelihood. Other forms of 
protectable intellectual property, like music, screenplays, or 
brand names, limit the use of certain note compilations, 
story plots, and wordplays within catchy titles, yet these are 
deemed deserving of protection. I fail to see how fashion 
should be treated differently—a popping red-soled heel is 
just as artistic and worthy of brand protection as a Nike 
swoosh at the base of a pair of basketball shorts or a musical 
sequence inherent in an original song.101 
 Even after the ITC finalizes a Section 337 violation, 
the decision must then undergo presidential review.102 The 
President can either approve the decision, or veto it based 
                                                
	  
	  
101 See Nike Logo, FAMOUS LOGOS, http://famouslogos.net/nike-logo/ 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (describing the design elements and history of 
the Nike logo); see also Kory Grow, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Lose Multi-
Million Dollar ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit, ROLLING STONE, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/robin-thicke-and-pharrell-
lose-blurred-lines-lawsuit-20150310?page=2 (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) 
(explaining the alleged infringement lawsuit between Marvin Gaye’s 
“Got to Give it Up’ and Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines”). 
102 Id.  
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upon his or her own considerations of related policy and 
practices and, especially, foreign policy violations.103 Cases 
at the ITC are adjudged and decided on a case-by-case basis 
and, accordingly, it would be merely speculative to 
presuppose the ITC’s and the President’s overall settlement 
of a case like the Louboutin case. However, it is possible that 
Louboutin could have been granted relief more in line with 
what it desired, had it brought its case to the ITC, because 
this forum considers more than just a product-to-product 
comparison and would prohibit future importation of Yves 
Saint Laurent’s allegedly infringing shoes into the U.S.   
 
VI.   EU DESIGN RIGHT FRAMEWORK 
 
The European Union’s (“EU”) two-tiered system of 
legal design protection takes a more rational approach to the 
safeguarding of fashion designs, recognizing that fashion 
designers collaborate with and are influenced by other 
designers as a common practice.104 Unlike the U.S., design 
protection in the EU does not require a patent standard of 
originality (like the U.S.’ novelty and nonobviousness 
standards) and designs are not dissected into ornamental 
and functional parts, which, under U.S. law, require separate 
protections.105 Furthermore, the EU recognizes different 
remedies for works of varied-inventive strength: there are 
                                                
	  
	  
103 Id.  
104 See generally Monseau, supra note 10, at 27; see also Erika Myers, Justice 
in Fashion: Cheap Chic and the IP Equillibrium in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, 37 AIPLA Q. J. 47, 58 (2009) (“copying occurs between all 
layers of the fashion industry.”). 
105 Id. at 57-58 (citing 35 U.S.C. §171, §101 (2006)); see also Phillips, supra 
note 42, at 1198. 
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stronger remedies for unique, original designs, and weaker 
remedies for works that possess minimal inventiveness.106  
The most notable and influential of the EU’s design 
right statutes is the Design Regulation.107 Under this 
regulation, designs are “automatically protected at the time 
of their public release under the Unregistered Community 
Design (“UCD”),” and this protection lasts for three years 
from the date of public release in the EU.108 This innovative 
strategy protects fashion designs from exploitation, 
imitation, and other forgery for free for the allotted three-
year span before design protection registration is obtained. 
The U.S. has no such easily-obtained, short-term protection 
for inventive new designs in the high consumer demand 
world of fashion, but it seems to be an intriguing aspect of 
the EU law to implement in the U.S. intellectual property 
realm. It is important to note, however, that the only 
protection provided for UCDs is against designs that are 
regarded as intentional copies—this coincides with the EU’s 
overarching theme of wanting to promote creative design 
and to uphold the customary dealings within the fashion 
industry.109 It is possible that the strong intellectual property 
protections already in place in the U.S. would not mesh well 
with this somewhat lenient unregistered right shield. 
Registered Community Designs (“RCDs”) are the 
lesser-used tier of design protection in the EU.110 RCDs offer 
25 years of protection from the date of filing and provide 
protection for both intentional infringement, and even 
                                                
	  
	  
106 Id. at 76. 
107 Id. (referencing Council Regulation 6/2002, 2002 O.J. (L3) 1 (EC) 
[hereinafter Design Regulation]). 
108 Diamond, supra note 65, at 22. 
109 See Monseau, supra note 10, at 27. 
110 See id. at 60. 
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infringement done in good faith.111 Facially, the RCD system 
seems very similar to U.S. design patents. However, the 
most important nuance to the EU Design Regulation is that 
“designs are only prohibited where an informed user can 
find virtually no difference between the design and an 
earlier design”112 The EU’s “new” and “individual 
character” standards are much more relaxed than the U.S.’s 
nonobvious and novelty standards.113  
 
A.  APPLYING EU DESIGN RIGHTS TO THE LOUBOUTIN CASE 
 
The Louboutin case would have been resolved in a 
manner more in line with the initial district court decision, 
should the EU’s Design Regulation standards have been 
applied to the case. The EU would likely have regarded 
Louboutin’s claim of ownership over the red-hued sole of its 
heels as unconvincing. Regardless of the innovation 
incorporated into the design of the red-soled pumps, it 
would be too restricting, especially in the domain of fashion 
design, to give one designer ultimate control over a single 
color. Furthermore, Yves Saint Laurent’s use of 
monochromatic colors for the entirety of its heels, including 
the sole of the shoe, would likely be interpreted in the EU as 
a “new” design with “individual character,” distinct enough 
from the overall impression of Louboutin’s contrasting 
                                                
	  
	  
111 Diamond, supra note 65, at 22. 
112 Monseau, supra note 10, at 59; see, e.g., Jimmy Choo Ltd. V. 
Towerstone Ltd., EWHC (Ch) 346 (2008) (holding that the minor 
differences between Towerstone’s bag and Jimmy Choo’s Ramona did 
not influence the overall impression given by the bag and, because the 
bag was seemingly identical to the Choo design, an informed user would 
confusingly regard the two bags as coming from the same brand). 
113 Id. at 58-59; but see Phillips, supra note 42, at 1198.  
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colored-soled heels so as to not constitute intentional 
copying.114  
 
B.   LOUBOUTIN’S TRADEMARK WOULD LIKELY NOT HAVE 
RECEIVED MORE PROTECTION IN EUROPE THAN WHAT 
WAS GRANTED TO IT BY THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE 
UNITED STATES . . . OR PERHAPS NOT ANY PROTECTION 
AT ALL  
 
 Louboutin chose not to sue Yves Saint Laurent in 
Europe, even under a trademark theory, and, based upon 
precedential case law and future decisions made abroad, its 
choice not to do so appears to be in its interest. Earlier cases 
demonstrated that colors had to be portrayed in a 
“systematic arrangement associating the colours concerned 
in a predetermined and uniform way.”115 Accordingly, 
Louboutin’s use of bright red coloration solely on the soles 
of its designer heels, paired with the stark contrasting color 
of the overall shoe color, might meet such standards to 
suffice the acquisition of a trademark, but that trademark 
would not extend to a monopoly over the color red, thus 
barring Yves Saint Laurent’s use of red on the entirety of its 
shoe, including the sole.116 
                                                
	  
	  
114 Compare id.  
115 See Taylor Piscionere, Imitation May Not Always Be The Sincerest Form of 
Flattery: Why Color Wars in the United States and Europe May Result in 
Brand Dilution and Color Depletion, 25 PACE INT’L L. REV. 43, 58 (2013) 
(quoting Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark 
Registration, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 477 (2005) (citing Case C-49/02, 
Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-06129 ¶35))). 
116 Id. 
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 A more recent case in Europe—the Netherlands, 
specifically—suggests that Louboutin may not have 
intellectual property protection over its red soles at all. A 
Belgian Court invalidated Louboutin’s registered trademark 
because European law does not permit trademark 
registration for “signs consisting of shapes that give 
substantial value to goods.”117 The Benelux region has now 
affirmatively set precedent that limits a single trademark 
holder from acquiring exclusive control over a “technical, 
functional, or aesthetic” product quality.118 Furthermore, the 
judge made mention of the fact that red soles are more 
commonplace in the fashion market than Louboutin alleges, 
and that Louboutin’s red soles are not necessarily distinctive 
enough to serve as a brand indicator.119 In this respect, 
European intellectual property frameworks may further 
limit the protection afforded to fashion brands, like 
Louboutin, than the less-than-desired protection afforded by 
the District Court in the U.S. 
 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 
Although utilizing the ITC for a case like Louboutin 
runs slightly counter to the original intentions of the ITC, the 
powers of the ITC have been so greatly expanded by the 
loosening of the Section 337 domestic industry requirements 
that a foreign company, like Louboutin, can more easily 
                                                
	  
	  
117 Jeff Sistrunk, Belgian Court Invalidates Louboutin Red Sole Trademark, 
LAW360 (2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/523464/belgian-
court-invalidates-louboutin-red-sole-trademark (last visited Feb. 12, 
2016) (referencing Christian Louboutin v. Van Dalen Footwear BV, AR 
2013-6154 (2014)). 
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
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bring suit to protect its national industry, albeit in a 
previously domestic-heavy forum.120 While the 
determinations made by the ITC do not hold the same 
finality and preclusive effect as determinations made in 
district courts, the protections provided by the ITC do meet 
the immediate needs of certain patent holders, like those that 
Louboutin held in this case.121 Furthermore, even if a party is 
technically allowed to bring a case previously resolved at the 
ITC to a U.S. district court for subsequent litigation, these 
actions are not always carried out due to the time, energy, 
and expense required for dual litigation (especially if there is 
a possibility of failure based on the litigation experience at 
the ITC).122 
Should Louboutin have acquired a design patent for 
its popping red soles, which seems appropriate given the 
nonfunctional and “new, original, [and] ornamental” design 
of the stylized heel embellishment, then using the ITC as a 
forum might have provided Louboutin with a more 
favorable outcome, thus ousting Yves Saint Laurent’s red 
sole lookalikes from importation into and competition 
within the U.S.123 Other intellectual property protection 
routes, including the European design right model, do not 
seem to afford Louboutin the same hopes of desired, 
comprehensive shielding from unfair competition and 
deceptive imitation as does the ITC. Fashion designers like 
Louboutin should think twice about which intellectual 
                                                
	  
	  
120 See Bugg, supra note 8, at 1098-99. 
121 See Krupka, Swain, and Levine, supra note 96, at 799.  
122 Note that this does not preclude the ability of a party to bring an 
infringement case to the ITC and district court simultaneously in hopes 
of acquiring the different remedies provided at each forum: namely, 
importation prohibition and monetary rewards, respectively.  
123 Phillips, supra note 42, at 1198. 
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protections to acquire for their products and, if necessary, 
within which forum to employ those protections in the 
unfortunate event of infringement or unfair competition.  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
